WEBVTT 00:00.420 --> 00:02.670 Hello and welcome to the second lecture. 00:02.940 --> 00:13.460 And out of hikin humans intro to social engineering presented by our city and this lecture we look at 00:13.460 --> 00:23.270 why social engineering is adopted by a malicious updos in 2017 some major cyber attacks or could. 00:23.380 --> 00:30.430 There was one of cry pecial not Pitsea Equifax breach and it was also revealed that all yahoo accounts 00:30.430 --> 00:32.840 were compromised in a previous breach. 00:34.590 --> 00:41.630 Why not cry on paternal Petchey I walk around somewhere with one of and computer systems in over 100 00:41.680 --> 00:42.770 countries. 00:43.010 --> 00:52.860 Ted Turner Petya resulted in cost in international shipping company mask's three hundred million dollars. 00:52.870 --> 01:00.740 There has been a rise in cyber attacks whether targeted individuals businesses or nation states. 01:00.750 --> 01:05.930 However there is something that most of these attacks seem to have in common. 01:05.950 --> 01:11.250 They are mentally initiated and spread by taking advantage of human weaknesses. 01:12.460 --> 01:16.970 Which makes these attacks easier and cheaper to propagate. 01:16.980 --> 01:19.570 So what motivates social engineers. 01:20.620 --> 01:25.760 Social engineering could be used by a malicious individuals for various reasons. 01:25.810 --> 01:35.220 These include pranks gaining on authorized access to confidential information and data extortion and 01:35.300 --> 01:45.270 blackmail or initiating attacks some social engineers carry out social engineering solely for the purpose 01:45.360 --> 01:52.830 of practical jokes to make fun of their targets where the individuals organizations or even nation states 01:53.880 --> 02:01.560 these type of attacks usually low risk in terms of impact on their targets but may also be a way of 02:01.590 --> 02:08.970 expressing an ideological or political views to the target and can affect their target in terms of reputation 02:09.540 --> 02:15.000 which could have adverse effects on the target's business customers for example or those who patronize 02:15.000 --> 02:20.560 their target victim might end up shot into a victim resulting in adverse effects on the victims or on 02:20.570 --> 02:21.660 an investment. 02:21.690 --> 02:29.670 Malicious attackers also use social engineering to gain access to information and data that they are 02:29.670 --> 02:37.680 not supposed to have access to which they can Freude use to get access to more authorized data on information 02:37.710 --> 02:41.620 of victims like online banking credentials. 02:41.620 --> 02:45.680 Got details and so on the other to rise. 02:45.690 --> 02:53.520 Access can be used to steal identity funds confidential information like trade secrets and the like. 02:54.390 --> 03:01.350 Malicious or once they have compromised a target using social engineering can have unbridled access 03:01.350 --> 03:09.820 to confidential information and data and take control of such as a result of the aforementioned they 03:09.820 --> 03:17.260 can hold such data or information hostage in exchange for funds or threaten to reveal secrets content 03:17.290 --> 03:20.900 in the data out to the public if certain demands are not met. 03:21.070 --> 03:26.130 The secrets could range from trade secrets to embarrass and personal habits. 03:26.190 --> 03:33.550 This can be seen in ransomware social engineers can leverage the data they compromise to fall victims 03:33.550 --> 03:34.990 to give them what they want. 03:35.080 --> 03:38.540 Life funds or assets or whatever. 03:39.910 --> 03:46.660 A malicious attacker cannot only get access to an authorized data via social engineering get an access 03:46.660 --> 03:51.500 to confidential logical access or system controls is possible. 03:51.850 --> 03:58.120 These can be used to launch attacks on a system or network using things like malware. 03:58.150 --> 04:05.010 An example could be seen in the case of stock that which was e-mail model where it wanted to be precise. 04:05.030 --> 04:11.930 That target that suspected uranium enrichment systems in Iran it was initiated using social engineering 04:11.930 --> 04:12.560 techniques. 04:12.710 --> 04:14.830 So why is social engineering adopted. 04:16.190 --> 04:23.390 Well the easiest way to break into a system is to target the weakest point malicious attack us adopt 04:23.390 --> 04:32.440 social engineering as a means of attaining the militias goals because it is cheaper less complicated 04:33.340 --> 04:36.320 readily available and safer. 04:38.900 --> 04:44.590 Instead of employing very expensive I.T. infrastructure to carry out a malicious attack or breach on 04:44.740 --> 04:50.490 the system compromising the operators of the system would be a wise choice. 04:50.510 --> 04:52.300 It is far less expensive. 04:53.270 --> 05:00.010 Compromise and the human element saves the cost and trouble of cracking codes decryption having to make 05:00.010 --> 05:07.630 a prison break in or physically capturing on important relevant systems operator going back to the case 05:07.630 --> 05:14.680 of Stuxnet on the Iranian nuclear systems getting the systems infected by means of social engineering 05:14.680 --> 05:21.610 was cheaper than trying to get someone in to infect the systems with malware or trying to hack into 05:21.610 --> 05:26.480 the network to get infected or trying to physically destroy the infrastructure. 05:27.520 --> 05:34.680 The cost effectiveness of social engineering can also be seen in e-mail scams where the scammers could 05:34.690 --> 05:42.300 be from very poor backgrounds and yet could hit a jackpot with little or no financial investments. 05:43.000 --> 05:49.410 Social engineering attacks do not require a lot of sophistication to be carried out. 05:49.420 --> 05:54.820 Requirement of complicated tools and techniques for initiating attacks can be significantly reduced 05:55.120 --> 05:58.600 or even eliminated with the adoption of social engineering techniques. 05:58.600 --> 06:05.440 Social engineering is also more readily available and easier to deploy done more sophisticated attack 06:05.440 --> 06:11.940 techniques like direct hacking which could be stalled due to cost of the beauty of tools or the target 06:11.950 --> 06:18.310 having very good physical and electronic defenses like foules anti-malware software or anti-hacking 06:18.310 --> 06:19.550 devices. 06:19.630 --> 06:26.580 Crimes like armed robbery or kidnapping can be very risky to life and limb of criminals. 06:26.590 --> 06:31.270 Moreover they might end up not getting the desired returns despite the risk taking. 06:31.300 --> 06:37.350 So for example scummers would be more at ease engaging in the crime of scamming. 06:37.480 --> 06:41.140 Patiently waiting until they strike gold. 06:41.220 --> 06:44.120 There is less stress on even if caught. 06:44.130 --> 06:51.800 This sentence is not likely to be as bad as that of engaging in more dangerous crimes like Groby kidnapping 06:51.830 --> 06:53.970 or human trafficking. 06:54.060 --> 06:58.530 This is likely to be later on if we pare back to this. 06:58.580 --> 07:06.160 In that case again we can see that it was easier to use social engineering to get the Iranian systems 07:06.550 --> 07:12.580 infected sending agents in to do the job could have exposed the agents to capture or death. 07:13.150 --> 07:22.270 And in the event the agents of course they might be broken down or made to reveal more precious information 07:23.050 --> 07:29.020 about their employers which could make the operation counter productive. 07:30.430 --> 07:42.470 Using a mall would also be risky as it might not be easy to design or where the malls Latty really lies. 07:42.610 --> 07:50.310 So has just a brief synopsis of what could end up next case on how it can be used to emphasize Weisel 07:50.320 --> 07:56.540 social Anyway I doubt adopted stocks net thought to have been developed in a joint operation between 07:56.540 --> 08:04.340 the U.S. and Israel targeted suspected Iranian uranium enrichment facilities specifically in Natanz 08:04.730 --> 08:05.550 in 2010. 08:07.010 --> 08:13.730 It was a new type of malware in that it was destruction of physical infrastructure as opposed to the 08:13.730 --> 08:21.700 tradition obligations of such malware or they are affecting information systems the Iranian uranium 08:21.700 --> 08:27.700 enrichment infrastructure all were kept off the internet for security reasons fear of being hacked. 08:28.030 --> 08:34.340 But this will all managed to get through the computer systems running into a uranium enrichment facility. 08:34.340 --> 08:37.520 How is that who USV thumb drives. 08:40.140 --> 08:42.760 B that the facility was off the net. 08:42.930 --> 08:49.020 The originators of stocks net infected the computer systems of some companies that were contractors 08:49.020 --> 08:52.830 to the facility in Athens probably to the Internet. 08:54.110 --> 09:00.320 Employees in these companies use the U.S. drives on their systems getting them infected and then for 09:00.320 --> 09:09.020 the fact that they're not on systems they use deadrise on their warm then clothing from rated over the 09:09.020 --> 09:11.000 network in the facility. 09:11.000 --> 09:18.050 The result was that the uranium enrichment centrifuges failed on an unprecedented scale. 09:20.230 --> 09:26.890 From default when we see that the initiators of stocks that saw the challenges of getting into the facility 09:27.060 --> 09:33.880 and not does it get infected it would have been difficult to get someone to the opposite Guddi it could 09:33.880 --> 09:36.340 not have been infiltrated remotely. 09:36.360 --> 09:42.130 It was not connected to the Internet and a physical assault on the facility would probably be too costly 09:42.160 --> 09:44.920 both in terms of finance and lives. 09:46.210 --> 09:54.920 So they decided to make employees of the contract of companies on within Korea as of the malware we 09:54.920 --> 10:01.610 will disclose baiting of which aversion involves the winner and Tyson malware infected external storage 10:01.610 --> 10:10.160 media about in order to get an unsuspecting curious victim to inside to the storage media on his computer 10:10.160 --> 10:12.200 system and get it infected. 10:12.960 --> 10:17.660 This question was what was initially suspected to have been adopted to initiate the attack. 10:18.410 --> 10:24.140 However debating that was applied in this case was to get unsuspecting inquiries infected to get the 10:24.140 --> 10:24.800 job done. 10:26.150 --> 10:33.860 The case of Stuxnet was initiation of attack by taking advantage of the human weaknesses inherent in 10:33.860 --> 10:40.690 their own witta inquiries of the malware this saved the perpetrators the hassle and cost of getting 10:40.720 --> 10:45.120 access to the systems and Natans physically or emotionally. 10:45.440 --> 10:53.270 Granting the malware infection easy access it also saved from the risk of losing agents going to the 10:53.270 --> 10:58.300 facility to carry out the act which would have led to capture or death or even betrayal. 10:59.360 --> 11:05.070 Cost of crowding out a physical assault was also avoided which would have also resulted in death or 11:05.110 --> 11:09.000 capture or compromise of those who carry out the attack. 11:09.150 --> 11:10.290 Have been or went. 11:10.300 --> 11:11.230 Collateral damage.